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Vergleichende Analyse des „Patriotismus“ als 
Erziehungsziel in China und Japan
In the eyes of much of the Japanese public, “patriotism education” in China is synonymous with anti-Japanese 
education, and a source of friction. Much of that friction, however, can be attributed to the differing roles and 
functions of “patriotism” in the two countries as well as the variant connotations of the very word for “patrio-
tism”. 
In China, the communist party avails itself of the strong levels of patriotism among the people in order to 
advance modernization of the country. Patriotism education is not designed to serve as anti-Japanese educa-
tion. In Japan, however, given the country’s past role as an aggressor nation, that word has had consistently 
negative connotations. Debates over its own patriotism have continued and there are accordingly inexorable 
apprehensions over patriotism education in China.
To address the recurrent frictions between these two countries, both must overcome their ignorance about 
the differences that Chinese and Japanese societies manifest. 
Unter der „patriotischen Erziehung“ in China versteht man in Japan generell eine anti-japanische Erziehung. Der 
bilaterale Streit um diese chinesische Bildungspolitik liegt aber in der unterschiedlichen Stellung begründet, 
welche der Begriff „Patriotismus“ in der Gesellschaft der beiden Nationen einnimmt.
In der Annahme, dass es einen ausgeprägten Patriotismus im Volk gibt, hat sich die Kommunistische Partei 
die patriotische Erziehung zunutze gemacht, um den Staat zu modernisieren. Die anti-japanische Erziehung war 
dabei zumindest nicht beabsichtigt. Andererseits bekam der Patriotismus in Japan, durch die eigene Erfahrung 
des Invasionskriegs, eine negative Konnotation. Dort ist die Debatte um den heimischen Patriotismus noch 
nicht abgeschlossen, und auch die chinesische Bildungspolitik wird sehr kritisch angesehen. 
Um die wiederholten Konflikte zwischen den beiden Ländern zu lösen, muss man bei der Überwindung des 
gegenseitigen Unwissens und der Gleichgültigkeit bezüglich der Unterschiede ihrer Gesellschaften anfangen. 
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1.  Sino-Japanese tensions over 
the issue of patriotism
In the eyes of much of the Japanese public, “patrio-
tism education” in China is synonymous with “anti-
Japanese education.” This view quickly became even 
more prevalent after the pelting and attacks of the 
Japanese consulate and Japanese-owned businesses 
by young demonstrators in Shanghai in April of 2005. 
The notion that it has served to fuel anti-Japanese sen-
timent among the Chinese public has been advanced 
not only by right-leaning Japanese media outlets, as 
may be expected, but even by prominent Japanese 
researchers of Modern China (Yabuki 2004; Amako 
2004). There have also been, of course, voices in Ja-
pan calling for an understanding of the stances taken 
by the Chinese people and the Chinese government. 
When one considers the wars of aggression that have 
been waged against China in the past, and the litany 
of words and actions even in the post-war era by right-
of-center Japanese politicians intended to glorify that 
aggression, it would hardly be surprising for anti-
Japanese education in China to achieve a measure of 
success.
There has been, however, a lack of critical inquiry 
into the issues of whether patriotism education in 
China is truly anti-Japanese, and why Japanese have 
interpreted it as such. Whenever Japan, for example, 
expresses through various channels its wish that Chi-
na refrain from engaging in anti-Japanese education, 
Chinese interpret that as gratuitous interference in 
China’s domestic affairs. Upon eliciting a response to 
the effect that, “There is no anti-Japanese education 
going on in the first place,” the Japanese almost with-
out exception perceive in that response insincerity on 
the part of the Chinese. This paper seeks to address 
these issues by clarifying the different functions the 
word “patriotism” serves in both Chinese and Japa-
nese political contexts.
Before we examine the differences in how patriotism 
is understood, it might be useful, particularly to West-
ern readers, to revisit how the ideas of constitutional 
patriotism were received in both countries. In sum, in 
both countries, its advocates are only to be found in in-
tellectual circles. To some degree or another, the same 
trend can be found in Europe (Edye 2003). Nevertheless, 
there is a difference in the way in which constitutional 
patriotism was received in China and Japan. 
Takahiro Kondo and Xiaoyan Wu Journal of Social Science Education 
A comparative study of “patriotism” as a goal of school education in China and Japan Volume 10, Number 1, 2011, pp. 23–32
24
In China, constitutional patriotism began to gain at-
tention when Jürgen Habermas travelled in April 2001 
to Beijing and Shanghai to give a series of eight lectures. 
As we shall see below, policies were being pursued at 
the time that sought to place nationalism at the foun-
dations of patriotism, and constitutional patriotism 
captured the theoretical interests of some scholars and 
students as an alternative to those policies. 
In Japan, on the other hand, constitutional patrio-
tism was introduced with a speech by President Rich-
ard von Weizsäcker to the Bundestag commemorating 
the 40th anniversary of the end of the war. It contin-
ued to receive attention in Japan as a position articu-
lated by Habermas during the Historikerstreit. More 
specifically, it was embraced by some – mainly on the 
left – as a formula for addressing the pressing “his-
tory issue” that Japan faced. It took root as a political 
concept that was critical of post-war Japanese society. 
The notion of allegiance to the constitution made con-
stitutional patriotism particularly attractive to the 
left, which holds as an ideal strict adherence to the 
current Japanese constitution and its renunciation 
of war. At the same time, however, there was also a 
strong aversion to the word “patriotism”. Those who 
argued for the deconstruction of the nation-state in 
particular viewed constitutional patriotism as a tactic 
to extend the life of that very nation-state, and there-
fore distanced themselves from it.
The above demonstrates the difference in context 
in which “patriotism” is viewed in the two countries: 
namely, in China it is an entirely ordinary member of 
the lexicon, whereas in Japan it is a concept that must 
be broached with a great deal of sensitivity. The fail-
ure by people of both countries to understand this dif-
ference is a significant source of friction. 
It is safe to conclude that one of the biggest rea-
sons for the misunderstanding involves the Chinese 
characters that have been used in Japan since the 
fifth century. Pertinent here is the fact that Japan and 
China share the same two-character compound that 
approximates the English “patriotism” (pronounced 
aiguo in Chinese and aikoku in Japanese).
While the compound aiguo is first attested in Zhan 
Guo Ce, a work of history written in China in the first 
century BCE, it only gained popular currency in the 
latter half of the 19th century, and in Japan. Over the 
course of Japan’s modernization, Japanese thinkers 
had learned the word “patriotism” from Europeans. 
In translating the word into Japanese, they chose the 
word aikoku, which has a Chinese-sounding quality to 
it, and words of Chinese origin have a canonical air of 
authority to most Japanese ears. The word was even-
tually “reintroduced” into the Chinese language by 
Chinese intellectuals that had studied in Japan. 
Early in the 20th century, however, aiguo and aikoku 
began to take on separate connotations. Socialists 
and pacifists in Japan began to interpret aikoku as 
causes of war or as tools of imperialism. A Japanese 
work published in 1931 called the Proletariat’s Diction-
ary defines patriotism as:
A fanatical belief in and love of the current state as su-
preme. To this, Marxists respond, “The state exists as a 
historical form. The state is an organ of one class‘s re-
pression of other classes. Patriotism is an ideology that 
seeks to protect the interests of capitalists and landown-
ers by exploiting and enslaving laborers and farmers.” 
(Kyoseikaku Henshubu 1931, 1)
As is described below, in the early years of post-war Ja-
pan there were socialist figures who held up the ideal 
of aikoku, but any such stance among the political left 
in present-day Japan would indeed be an anomaly.
Among Chinese socialists, on the other hand, aiguo 
came to form the core of their own political slogans. 
For example, writing in 1938, Mao Zedong rhetorically 
answers the question of whether a Communist Party 
member, who is by nature an internationalist, can also 
be a patriot, by unambiguously stating, “We hold that 
he not only can be but must be” (Mao 1970, 242-243). 
Mao held that no fundamental contradiction existed 
between the internationalism and patriotism as es-
poused by the Communist Party. 
Such differences in attitudes on aikoku/aiguo 
among socialists in China and Japan clearly stem from 
the relations between the two countries from the lat-
ter half of the 19th century to the first half of the 20th. 
Socialists in the aggressor nation argued that patrio-
tism was a deceit to mobilize the citizenry to engage 
in war. In contrast, the socialists on the other side – 
those in the nation with no recourse but resistance 
– made it their raison d‘etre. 
Previous studies on Sino-Japanese friction have not 
taken sufficient note of these differences in the his-
tories of the two countries in the first half of the 20th 
century. Furthermore, little study has been done on 
the differing connotations of “patriotism” in the two 
countries. Section 2 below describes the evolving pol-
icies on and realities of patriotism education in China, 
and Section 3 explores the same issues in Japan.
2.  Patriotic education in China: 
policies and realities
2.1. The transformation of patriotism
The nature of patriotism as an educational goal in 
schools in China has undergone major transforma-
tions over the course of the economic reforms that 
began in 1978 and gained momentum in the 1990s. 
Specifically, the principle underpinning patriotism 
has changed from socialism to nationalism. 
Let us first examine that change as reflected in the 
curricula of academic subjects pertaining to politics. 
China’s school system has courses in political subjects 
for pupils and students at every stage of their edu-
cation, from primary school through university. The 
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government has attached a great deal of importance 
to political subjects, as is evident from the way in 
which the educational content of these courses has 
often been dictated directly by the Central Commit-
tee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC), which 
is the top tier of the leadership, and by the CCCPC’s 
Propaganda Department. These are subjects that deal 
with political philosophy, human values, social mor-
als, and other components of the basic norms that 
shape how people live and how society functions. 
The transformations mentioned above become more 
apparent when one looks at how the educational con-
tent required of political courses by the government’s 
curriculum guidelines has changed.
Table 1:  Changes to the educational content of political subjects 
in junior and senior secondary schools
Main educational content 1980s 1990s 2000s
1 Moral education, encompassing patriotism, fraternity, honesty, etc. x x x
2 Cultivating communist morality x   
3 Marxist theory of historical development x x  
4 Basic tenets of Marxist economics x   
5 Basic tenets of Marxist political science x   
6 Basic tenets of dialectical materialism x x x
7 China’s economic system, political system, and foreign policy x x x
8 Knowledge of taxation, finance, and other aspects of economics; aware-
ness of market economies
 x x
9 Instilling respect for the law; tenets of democracy  x x
10 Mental, physical, and personal development; adolescent education  x x
11 Inheriting traditional cultures; cultivating a sense of national identity x
12 Education of the people-as-sovereign and social participation regarding 
rights and civic values
  x
13 The state of globalization; cultivating international perspectives   x 
(Compiled by Wu based on curriculum guidelines for political subjects issued in 1982, 1996-97, and 2003)
Table 1 above shows that in the early 1980s, soon after 
China embarked on its policy of reform, Marxist-relat-
ed content still overwhelmingly dominated lessons 
and students were still receiving communist-oriented 
educations. In the 1990s, however, content related 
to market economies had increased. And since 2000, 
China’s response to globalization has become a major 
concern. 
Although patriotism has consistently been an 
education goal in this period spanning over three 
decades, during that time the object of that patrio-
tism has shifted from a socialist state to a national 
collective. Put differently, students in the 1980s were 
expected to have a grounding in Marxist education 
and serve the ideals of socialism, but in the 1990s they 
were expected to contribute to the modernization of 
the country by using their knowledge of market econ-
omies. Furthermore, in the 21st century, a more inter-
national perspective and a sense of national identity 
have come to be expected of students. In this progres-
sion, the objectives of political science education, to-
gether with those of the Communist Party itself, have 
successfully transformed.
A similar, profound transformation can be seen in 
history education as well. This is epitomized in the 
way in which the Second Sino-Japanese War is writ-
ten about. In history textbooks from the early 1980s, 
the clash between the Communist Party and the Chi-
nese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) form the core 
of descriptions of the conflict, with accounts of the 
achievements of the former and criticisms leveled at 
the governance of the latter taking up considerable 
space. The significance of the victory over the latter is 
portrayed in terms of the defeat of imperialism, and 
even the numbers of enemy troops vanquished are 
proudly touted.
In contrast, in textbooks used in the 1990s, there 
is more mention of cooperation from the Chinese 
National Party in the war of resistance against Japan. 
At the same time, acts of violence committed by the 
Japanese army and the devastation wrought upon the 
Chinese people came to be written about in more de-
tail. In other words, the focus shifted from the losses 
inflicted upon enemy forces to the losses suffered by 
the people of China. Furthermore, the significance 
of outcome is framed less in terms of a victory over 
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imperialism and more as a victory for the “Chinese 
nation”.
Perhaps it is inevitable that this kind of history 
education, i.e. that practiced in the 1990s, is seen by 
many Japanese people as anti-Japanese. However, the 
educational reforms mentioned above were not neces-
sarily intended from the start to target Japan. Rather, 
they are the product of larger changes in international 
and domestic circumstances. 
As the Cold War came to an end and the economy 
was increasingly marketized since the 1990s, the 
amount of discourse on socialism fell off sharply, and 
people began to focus on economic development, 
or to borrow Deng Xiaoping’s analogy, as long as it 
catches mice, it does not matter whether the cat is 
black or white. A host of socioeconomic problems 
were to follow as a consequence, such as massive un-
employment resulting from reforms of state-owned 
companies, large influxes of migrant workers into 
urban areas with the relaxation of restrictions on 
migration, and widening gaps between the rich and 
the poor. In dealing with these problems, nationalism 
was embraced as an alternative to socialism as a basis 
for social integration. 
One of the interesting aspects of this process of 
transition is the rise in popular levels of interest in 
traditional culture. Beginning at the end of the 1980s, 
people began to reappraise traditional Chinese cul-
ture, which had been decried as feudalistic during the 
socialist era, and statements calling for its rehabilita-
tion began to appear frequently in policy documents. 
This shift in the government’s stance sparked renewed 
interest in traditional culture that had been present 
among certain sections of the public and the print 
media. By the latter half of the 1990s that interest had 
given rise to what came to be called the “Chinese clas-
sics (guo xue) boom”. It is possible to discern in these 
phenomena an attempt to use distinctly Chinese val-
ues to react to western ideological, philosophical and 
socioeconomic influences, such as those embodied by 
the socialism of its past and the globalized economy 
of the contemporary era. 
The reform and “open-door” policies meant more 
than a mere shift in political education. It required 
that changes take place in the Communist Party of 
China at a more fundamental level. Such change is 
clearly evident in the “three represents”, which was 
championed by Jiang Zemin in 2000 and went on to 
become the guiding philosophy of the party. The ba-
sic idea of this philosophy is that the Communist Par-
ty should devote itself to the development of China’s 
economy and culture, and that “the Party must em-
phasize working for the interests of the people more 
than ever before.” What is most important is that 
what is being called for here is not the representation 
of the interests of the proletariat. In fact, when the 
Constitution of the Communist Party was amended 
at the 16th National Congress of the CPC in 2002, lan-
guage was added to the sentence “the Chinese Com-
munist Party is the vanguard of the Chinese working 
class” from the Party’s Statutes so that the Constitu-
tion read “vanguard both of the Chinese working class 
and of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation”. 
Qualifications for Party membership likewise became 
more inclusive. Specifically, the stated qualifications 
of „Any Chinese worker, poor peasant, lower-middle 
peasant, revolutionary armyman or any other revolu-
tionary element who has reached the age of eighteen“ 
was changed to read „Any Chinese worker, farmer, 
member of the armed forces, intellectual or any ad-
vanced element of other social strata who has reached 
the age of eighteen“, a revision that opened member-
ship to many more sections of society, including the 
new bourgeoisie (Zhang 2008). In doing so, the Com-
munist Party of China managed to transform itself 
from essentially a party of the proletariat to a party 
of the Chinese people.
There is little doubt that this transformation of the 
Party itself played a part in the changes to the curricu-
lum guidelines described above. For example, in its 
1983 Ideas on Strengthening Education to Promote 
Patriotism, the Propaganda Department stated:
We must, through patriotism education, cultivate among 
the public and young people an awareness of themselves 
as patriots. Further, by building upon that foundation, 
it is important that we deepen the level of ideological 
and political education, and develop patriots into com-
munists. (He 1998, 2108)
In contrast, in 1994 the CCCPC included in the Out-
lines of Patriotic Educational Environment the follow-
ing: 
The purpose of patriotism education is to strengthen a 
sense of national identity and power of unity of people, 
instill a sense of self-respect and pride as a people…direct 
the patriotic sentiments of the people to contributions 
toward the unification, prospering, and strengthening of 
the homeland, create socialist citizens with ideals, mor-
als, culture and discipline, and unite for the common ide-
als of the people. (He 1998, 3680)
Although we see here the qualifier “socialist (citizens)”, 
it is void of any substantial meaning. Following this 
publication, in 2001 the CCCPC issued the Executive 
Outlines of Citizen’s Moral Construction, and these 
were followed by the Executive Outlines of Education 
of National Spirit in Schools issued jointly in 2004 by 
the Propaganda Department and the Ministry of Edu-
cation. Common to all of these is the pursuit of a kind 
of education in patriotism and public morals rooted 
in a sense of national identity. In characterizing this 
series of outlines that began to appear in the mid-
1990s, it would not be an exaggeration to say that to-
gether they form a kind of “holy trinity” in that they 
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call for the restoration and cultivation of the national 
spirit of the great Chinese nation at all stages in the 
education of the public.
2.2. The diversification of patriotism
Of the three outlines noted above, the Outlines of 
Patriotic Educational Environment led to the designa-
tion of Patriotism Education Bases around the coun-
try. Playing a particularly central role are the model 
National Patriotism Education Bases named by the 
Propaganda Department, of which there were 356 as 
of 2009. There are also numerous Patriotism Educa-
tion Bases designated independently by other central 
agencies, local governments, and private groups. In 
addition to schools being encouraged by the govern-
ment to visit the bases, the bases are visited frequent-
ly by companies and other groups as part of their 
educational efforts, and even advertised in the mass 
media. 
Meanwhile, in Japan, the establishment of such 
bases has been viewed with a great deal of suspicion. 
In Japanese, the Chinese characters for “base” used 
here denote a military base, so to Japanese ears, the 
phrase “Patriotism Education Base” evokes images of 
a military installation where people receive patriotic 
education. 
In reality, however, most of these Patriotism Educa-
tion Bases are cultural centers housing historic sites 
and museums of history and science. People who visit 
“bases” such as the Great Wall or the Forbidden City 
ostensibly for the purposes of patriotism education 
generally have a more tourist-oriented mindset. Ac-
cording to government statistics, only about a third 
of visitors to Patriotism Education Bases responded 
that the purpose of their visit was to receive educa-
tion in patriotism (Liu 2007). In fact, there has even 
been controversy stirred over smiling tourists taking 
commemorative photos at Patriotism Education Bas-
es commemorating the war of resistance against Ja-
pan while wearing the uniforms of Imperial Japanese 
soldiers.
Also noteworthy is the growing interest in the eco-
nomic benefits as tourism to the bases becomes more 
common. Many hopes are resting on the development 
of tourism to bases to invigorate local economics, es-
pecially in rural areas. The Patriotism Education Base 
Tourism (“red tourism”) Development Plan, promul-
gated by the General Office of the CCCPC and the Gen-
eral Office of the State Council in December of 2004, 
set economic and employment targets to be met by 
2010: 100 billion yuan in income from tourism, and 
two million persons directly employed in the tourism 
industry (Cui 2009). 
Exposing more of the citizenry to artifacts of Chi-
nese history is undoubtedly an effective means of 
achieving the educational goal of cultivating patrio-
tism. However, people do not necessarily take away 
the same things from such educational experiences. 
At the very least, there is little question that not all 
of those educational opportunities are the sorts of 
things that many Japanese find disconcerting. 
Furthermore, as the fundamental underpinnings of 
patriotism shift from socialism to nationalism, peo-
ple’s notions of patriotism are becoming more diverse. 
In 2006 a questionnaire survey was given to one thou-
sand junior and senior high school students in Guang-
dong Province. The survey revealed that these young 
adults, who had grown up with patriotism education, 
have a unique conception of patriotism. For many of 
them, patriotism has very little to do with political 
teachings. For example, getting a receipt when eating 
at a McDonald’s is an act of patriotism in their eyes, 
because it prevents tax evasion at the restaurant and 
thereby helps ensure that the government receives tax 
revenues. In addition, learning proper Chinese, being 
polite and well-mannered while traveling or studying 
abroad, and protecting the natural environment are 
all seen as acts of patriotism (Wang 2006).
The government has also had to respond to young 
people’s notion of patriotism. In 2005, Shanghai se-
lected a pop song titled “Snail” that was popular with 
youngsters as a patriotic song. During the selection 
process, there were objections to the effect that the 
song’s lyrics, which include the lines, “I’ll keep climb-
ing step by step; At the top of the tree I will fly, rid-
ing on a leaf; The tears and sweat I’ve shed will by 
blown away by the wind; And someday I will have 
my own sky,” do not extol the virtues of serving the 
state or society and are far removed from patrio-
tism, but eventually it was concluded that the song 
could be considered patriotic in that the lyrics en-
courage people to work hard (Yue 2005 http://gb.cri.
cn/3821/2005/03/16/143@482919.htm). 
In relation to Japan, when the anti-Japanese demon-
strations erupted in cities throughout China in 2005 as 
mentioned at the beginning, the Propaganda Depart-
ment of the CCCPC and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
created Sino-Japanese relations propaganda teams 
that held lectures at universities and called for “ratio-
nal” displays of patriotism (Zhang 2005). Furthermore, 
it should be noted that the Communist Party’s news-
paper ran a special series and collection of interview 
essays with the theme “How to express the passion of 
patriotism”, criticizing extreme forms of nationalism 
(Xie 2005). One can see from these developments that 
the government does not simply promote patriotism, 
but rather tries to exercise control of it.
The government’s aims have, at least to a certain 
extent, been realized. It is true that similar incidents 
repeatedly occur whenever there is a new source of 
friction between Japan and China. Nevertheless, pa-
triotism on the part of young people is, for the most 
part, directed at working toward the modernization 
of the country. 
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This trend is also evident from the results of a sur-
vey of attitudes of 1,411 students at ten junior and 
senior high schools around China conducted by this 
author (Wu) in 2008 and 2009 (see Table 2). 
Table 2: What is a patriotic act? (Valid responses: 1,359; multiple choices allowed)
Choices % Choices %
A Participating in flag-raising ceremonies 81.5 G
Agreeing with everything the 
government says and does
5.2 
B Cherishing history and traditions 88.2 H Studying and working diligently 66.2 
C Buying domestically produced products 16.5 I
Protect the unity of the country even if it 
means the use of force
21.3 
D
Being critical of the government and 
society
41.5 J The people uniting 82.3 
E Creating a free and peaceful society 61.4 K
Working toward economic and 
technological development
79.0 
F Following the policies of the government 49.4 
When asked, “What to you is a patriotic act?”, most 
junior and senior high students chose: the people 
uniting or showing unity (A and J), valuing traditional 
culture (B), and working toward the development of 
the country (K). These results demonstrate that the 
message of the government mentioned above is be-
ing quite accurately conveyed to adolescents. At the 
same time, the low figures for C and I indicate that 
these students are not all exclusionist or aggressive 
in their beliefs.
Another interesting finding was that, when asked 
in a separate question about the ideals they subscribe 
to the most, “world peace” (33.9%) and “the develop-
ment of the Chinese people” (32.2%) far outweighed 
“the ideals of socialism” (8.5%). Policies designed to 
effect a shift from the principles of socialism to the 
principles of nationalism have resonated with young 
people, and at the same time, it seems they have ac-
quired a certain degree of caution regarding the dan-
gers of exclusionary nationalism.
It goes without saying that the results above repre-
sent to a certain degree what students think to be the 
model answers. In other words, there is no guarantee 
that they accurately reflect the students’ value sys-
tems. However, these results nonetheless demonstrate 
that patriotism education is being conducted with the 
intent to direct the patriotic sensibilities of the people 
not toward hostility for Japan, but toward the desire 
to contribute to the development of the country.
3.  The introduction of “patriotism” 
in Japanese schools
3.1. Patriotism in post-war Japanese society
The nationalistic form that patriotic education has 
taken in China since the 1980s has been viewed in 
Japan with apprehension and mistrust. Interestingly 
enough, however, not long after its establishment in 
the Chinese educational system, people in Japan be-
gan demanding that patriotism be introduced as an 
educational objective in Japanese schools.
In June of 2006, various Japanese newspapers re-
ported that the patriotism of pupils was evaluated 
in the grade reports of primary schools throughout 
the country. In all, the number of such schools to-
taled 190 (Asahi Shimbun 2006), which amounted 
to about 0.8 percent of the nation’s primary schools. 
Right around the same time, amendments to the Ba-
sic Act on Education were being debated in the Diet, 
with the conservative government pushing for the 
inclusion of patriotism as an educational goal and 
the opposition parties opposing it, and each with in-
tellectuals paraded to back its side of the argument. 
Put differently, these primary schools had redesigned 
their grade reports before the matter was settled by 
the Japanese Diet. While 0.8 percent may appear to be 
an almost negligible figure, it can nonetheless be seen 
as symbolic of the attitudes of many primary school 
teachers at the time. 
However, these developments are relatively recent.
The general perception in the field of education in Jap-
anese, which few would doubt is strongly influenced by 
left-leaning ideas, is that from the 1950s, under the direc-
tion of the American government, the conservative gov-
ernment of Japan has consistently pushed for a stronger 
sense of patriotism among the populace. The move that 
is perhaps most symbolic of this effort was the set of de-
mands made by US Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. 
Robertson in 1953 to the future Japanese Prime Minister 
Hayato Ikeda that Japan’s self-defense capabilities be 
strengthened and that patriotic education be institut-
ed. As a result, in 1958, classes in “morals” were intro-
duced for the first time into the Curriculum Guidelines 
for primary schools. This triggered criticisms that such 
classes were a restoration of the pre-war “moral science” 
( shu–shin) classes taught to instill patriotism. Comments 
by conservative politicians lamenting a lack of patrio-
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tism have continued more or less without interruption 
since.
While the perception that education has gradually 
but steadily taken on a right-wing bent since the 1950s 
is valid to a point, it overlooks two important facts. 
First, in the post-war years there were voices on the 
left that supported patriotism. Particularly worthy of 
note is the fact that the leadership of the Communist 
Party followed the Comintern in asserting that they 
were the true patriots. Their logic was that the Emper-
or-worshiping conservative factions in Japan, under 
the direction of American capital, were exploiting the 
Japanese people and preventing the formation of an 
independent socioeconomic and cultural entity. Such 
assertions and views were expressed in educational 
circles at that time as well. Tokumitsu Yagawa, a schol-
ar of Soviet education and prominent critic of the 
democratization of education being advanced under 
American occupation, wrote in a journal for educators, 
“Japanese schools are producing children with no na-
tional self-esteem” (Yagawa 1952, 7). The arguments 
presented here demonstrate that around 1950 there 
was a “tug-of-war” between the right and left in Japan 
regarding patriotism. There were even people on the 
left who looked to the socialist patriotism of the Com-
munist Party of China for models of education.
The second and more important fact is that after 
the latter half of the 1950s, this virtual tug-of-war over 
patriotism gave way to a broader transformation in 
the political landscape whose lines could be drawn by 
positions on that issue. More specifically, as time went 
on, “patriotism” became a term used primarily by the 
right. Its use came to be avoided by the left. 
The Cold War played a major role in this process. 
Once the conservatives – whose reign over govern-
ment would last from 1955 to 1993 – gained power, 
that government attempted to restore the patriotism 
education programs of the past, as already described. 
In order to make their opposition to the cultural and 
educational policies of the right unambiguously clear, 
the left began to demarcate their vocabulary, prefer-
ring to use different words such as “people” (jinmin/
minzoku) and “public” (minshu–).
One factor that played an important role in this 
shift in policy on the left side of the political spec-
trum was the collective experience of the war that 
had just ended. The term aikoku was associated too 
deeply with memories of the war. It may have been 
a useful term for the right-wing and conservative fac-
tions that sympathize, at least to an extent, with the 
political and social structures that pushed forward 
with the war, but for the left wing that opposed those 
factions, there existed concern over confusion on the 
part of supporters. By using different terms to convey 
essentially the same meaning, the forces on the po-
litical left were effectively able to convey their peace-
oriented message.
Naturally, this does not mean that the left rejected 
or ignored the notion of patriotism. As one example, 
the student-led anti-American protests of the 1960s 
and 1970s were fuelled primarily by the framework of 
early 20th century communist thought. Although no-
tions of the “people” and the “public” were favored 
in the discourse of the time, it would not be much 
of a stretch to deem the protests demonstrations of 
patriotism.
What is most important to remember is that the ex-
istence of this powerful left served as an impediment 
to patriotism education as administered by the con-
servative government. Despite the reality that both 
sides appealed to the patriotism of the people, the 
messages themselves conflicted. The real result was 
that neither the right, which actually used the term 
“patriotism” in its demands for education with a focus 
on tradition, nor the left, which made a strong show 
of opposition by teachers and educators, was able to 
achieve its objectives.
A definitive change to this situation happened 
around 1990. The left had been losing political momen-
tum since the 1970s. Economic development had large-
ly reduced the problem of poverty, which had been a 
major source of frustration among laborers, and after 
the US pulled out of Vietnam, notions of socialistic pa-
triotism were all but relegated to the periphery. Not 
only the word aikoku but the very notion became the 
exclusive property of right-leaning, conservative fac-
tions, and this was happening just as the world order 
imposed by the Cold War was being dismantled. 
The end of the Cold War marked the end of the era 
of the so-called “55-year regime” in Japan. The politi-
cal left fell apart. Not only that, but the decades-long 
dominance by the Liberal Democratic Party was like-
wise brought to a close. Amidst the ensuing political 
chaos, the right pushed for patriotism as an educa-
tional goal, and achieved a measure of success. One 
of the more interesting facets of the arguments put 
forth to stress the importance of patriotism educa-
tion was the issue of juvenile crime, which at the time 
was purported to be at record-high levels. Accord-
ing to the proponents of a “national reconstruction” 
based on traditional values, the fact that patriotism 
had not been taught in schools, which according to 
this argument were largely controlled by socialist 
teachers, was the reason for social ills such as juvenile 
crime. Though this is clearly at odds with the facts, it 
still holds sway with certain politicians. 
3.2.  The problem of assessing patriotism
The patriotism-oriented educational policies ad-
vanced under the leadership of the Liberal Democratic 
Party began with revisions to the official Curriculum 
Guidelines. The Curriculum Guidelines issued in 1989 
dictated thorough “guidance” regarding the national 
flag and national anthem. It should be noted that at 
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the time there were no legal provisions in place that 
declared the flag of the Rising Sun and Kimi-ga-yo to 
be the national flag and anthem, respectively. This led 
to the passage in 1999 of the so-called “National Flag 
and Anthem Act”.
By the end of the 20th century, the idea that the 
cultivation of patriotism should be made an educa-
tional goal had already become widespread among 
right-leaning interests. In fact, this was the reason 
for some schools adopting grade reporting standards 
that evaluated views on patriotism even before the 
Basic Act on Education was amended. Once the Cur-
riculum Guidelines reflecting the amendments to the 
Basic Act on Education were promulgated (2008), such 
educational policies were given more force. Particu-
larly worthy of note is that during the deliberations of 
the proposed amendments, a right-leaning group led 
by Liberal Democratic Party members pressured the 
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology to make sure that patriotism was taught 
in schools under the new incarnation of the law. As a 
consequence, for instance, the directive in the 1989 
Curriculum Guidelines was “to instruct students in 
the national anthem”, but in the new Guidelines this 
became more specific and directed teachers to “give 
students instructions until they can sing the national 
anthem”. (Monbukagakusho 2008, 69)
That said, these educational policies were met 
with major problems even before the ruling parties 
changed in 2009. Even at the schools that had insti-
tuted reports that graded “patriotism”, there were no 
clear ideas on how to assess patriotism. One primary 
school near Tokyo established the objective of “dem-
onstrating an interest in and proactively studying Jap-
anese history and traditions and loving one’s country” 
within the realm of social studies, but ultimately the 
teachers ended up by giving tests, just as they had al-
ways done, and were left with no choice but to evalu-
ate “patriotism” based on the results of usual social 
study’s test (Asahi Shimbun 2006). More than a few 
schools have implemented assessments of patriotism 
only to abandon them later due to the difficulties as-
sociated with grading. 
In addition to problems with grading, many peo-
ple, including conservative figures, have been critical 
of the very idea of assessing students based on cri-
teria that involve what students may think privately. 
Ultimately, contemporary Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi stated in a Diet session that assessments of 
patriotism are unnecessary (Tokyo Shimbun 2006).
Still, not assessing a subject does not necessarily 
mean not teaching it. The law clearly requires that 
patriotism be taught as an educational goal. Given 
these circumstances, some teachers and researchers 
in education continue to explore how patriotism can 
be taught effectively. One interesting idea that has 
emerged from these efforts is to conduct classes in 
such a way that students explore different areas from 
the standpoint of tourists and find what appeals to 
them at the different locales (Tani 2008). In this re-
spect one might discern a certain commonality with 
patriotism education initiatives in China. 
4. Commonalities between China and Japan
One very interesting aspect of nationalistic patrio-
tism education policies in China and Japan is that 
they were instituted roughly at the same time. More-
over, in both countries those policies have lacked fo-
cus and are extremely difficult to assess. In this re-
spect, one might conclude that both countries pushed 
these education policies through despite being able 
to anticipate from the beginning the difficulties that 
they posed. 
Also, when one looks at the factors defining the 
same era in these two countries, there is little evi-
dence to be found to support the argument that pa-
triotic or nationalistic education in Japan was a con-
temporaneous reaction to the patriotism education 
of China that preceded it. However, it would be dif-
ficult to argue that that very contemporaneousness is 
a mere coincidence. An assessment would be that, as 
the Cold War’s end shook the foundations of leader-
ship in both countries, forms of nationalistic patrio-
tism were fostered in both countries as a means to 
gain the support of the people. 
Nevertheless, the political functions served by the 
word “patriotism” differ between the two countries. 
In China, the government uses it effectively to build 
consensuses among broad sections of the population, 
while in Japan it tends to divide the population. The 
right in Japan maintains that “nationalism” is sig-
nificant in that it will effect a spiritual restoration of 
the nation, though people with whom that message 
resonates are in the minority while opposition to that 
point of view is clear and present. The only victories 
at the turn of the century that the right can claim are 
as a result of cooperation from the conservative and 
centrist factions who wish to remain on the ruling 
side as the remains of the left-right narrative fade. 
In addition to the differences mentioned at the be-
ginning stemming from the Japan’s role in relatively 
recent history as an aggressor and China as the victim 
of that aggression, the different degrees of modern-
ization and different Cold-War political alignments 
have also played a role.
In the eyes of the majority of the Japanese people 
– not to mention the right end of the spectrum that 
already sees China as a threat – excessive focus on 
patriotism by the Chinese government and people is 
seen as dangerous. In contrast, people in China that 
recognize the danger of Chinese patriotism turning 
into nationalism are in the minority. A more widely-
held apprehension is that of the danger of the speech 
and actions of right-leaning Japanese figures, which 
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they deem to have the approval of the Japanese public 
at large. 
Lastly, with regard to the initial question, research-
ers in Japan should not overlook the fact that the 
sense of patriotism and anti-Japanese sentiment had 
persisted among the Chinese people for a long time, 
and that policies taken to curb anti-Japanese senti-
ment, however insufficient, have been taken. 
In effect, patriotism education in China does en-
tail aspects that do not serve Japanese interests. Still, 
those policies are designed to maintain the hegemo-
ny of the Communist Party of China and to further the 
modernization of the state. Hence, there is no easy 
way to change them. In this context it is more impor-
tant to deepen a mutual understanding of the history 
of the modernization of the two countries, modern-
day society, and the current state of politics therein. 
Such understanding would make it possible to realize 
concrete measures to minimize the negative implica-
tions of nationalistic education in China
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